'y 6/7 




) D 619 

'^ \ .H8 

I Copy 2 



WENT TO WAR 



Submarine Warfare 
d. Prussian Militarism 



DAVID F. HOUSTON 

Secretary of Agriculture 



Vussian militarism should be permitted to dominate, then the 
VSaxon fight for free institutions and liberty, persisting from 
medetoYorktown * * * would have been made in vain." 



GERMANY'S PLEDGES TO A 

No. 1 (July 8, 1915).— "The Imperial 
peats the assurances that American ship, 
hindered in the prosecution of legitimate sh_ 
the lives of American citizens on neutral vessex, 
not be placed in jeopardy." 

No. 2 (September 1, 1915). — "Liners will not be sunlc 
by our submarines without warning and without safety 
of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners 
do not try to escape or offer resistance." 

No. 3 (October 5, 1915). — "The orders issued by His 
Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German 
submarines * * * have been made so stringent that 
the recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is 
considered out of the question." 

No. 4 (May 4, 1916). — "In accordance with the general 
practice of visit and search and destruction of merchant 
vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both 
within and without the area declared as naval war zone, 
shall not be sunk without warning and without saving 
human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer 
resistance.!' 

ALL OF THEM RUTHLESSLY BROKEN. 



D« Of D. 
JUN 19 I8ia 



y. 



X-" 



^% 



SUBMARINE WARFARE AND THE PRUSSIAN 
AUTOCRACY. 

WHY IS the United States at war inth Germany? Why 
all this preparation, expense, and jeopardy of thousands 
of American lives? Are we fighting the battles of Eng- 
land, France, Italy, and Russia? Are we in the war to pull 
the chestnuts of the Allies out of the fire? Are we fighting to 
help them recover lost territory or to acquire new posses- 
sions? Why do we fight at all? Why not employ peaceful 
means? Why not negotiate? 

These questions are now being asked not infrequently, es- 
pecially by German propagandists, by a few disloyal natives, 
and by some unintelligent and unpatriotic pacifists. Such 
people imagine that the time is opportune. They imagine that 
many Americans are astounded and resentful over the pros- 
pect of enormous expenditures, burdens of taxation, and sacri 
fice of life. They assume that there is, or will be, a reaction ; 
that the people have short memories. They place reliance on 
the fact that the scene of conflict is remote, that our people 
cannot appreciate that a defensive war can be waged by forces 
at a distance, and that aggressive action may be in the highest 
degree defensive. 

The main answer to these enemies of America within and 
without is simple. We are at war with Germany primarily 
to assert and to defend our rights, to make good our claim 
that we are a free nation, entitled to exercise rights long 
recognized by all the nations of the world, to exercise these 
rights without restraint or dictation from the Prussian autoc- 
racy and militarists, to have the kind of institutions we wish, 
and to live the kind of life we have determined to live. We 
are at war with Germany because Germany made war on 
us, sank our ships, and killed our citizens who were going 
about their proper business in places where they had a right 
to be, traveling as they had a right to travel. We either had 
to fight or keep our citizens and ships from the seas around 



4 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

England, France, and Italy, or to have our ships sunk and 
our people killed. 

We did not make this war. Germany made war on America, 
and only after exercising great patience and enduring grievous 
wrongs did we formally declare this to be a fact. For over 
two years Germany had committed hostile acts against our 
sovereignty, destroying the property and lives of our citizens, 
acts which if committed by any smaller power or power 
nearer home would have led to a quick demand from our people 
for a belligerent response. By turns, as it suited Germany's 
needs, she was apologetic and contemptuous, conciliatory and 
dictatorial, full of promises and heedless of them, finally repu- 
diating her most solemn obligations. In* the meantime, while 
we were extending hospitality to her diplomats here and rep- 
resenting her abroad, she was carrying on a hostile propa 
ganda within our own borders as well as abroad, promoting 
plots to destroy our plants, and attempting to sow dissen- 
sion among our people. Recall the history of our negotia- 
tions with Germany, of our attempts to secure justice by dip- 
lomatic, peaceful means. 

February 4, 1915, Germany declared that on' and after Feb 
ruary 18, 1915, she would regard the waters around Great 
Britain and Ireland, including the Channel, as a war zone 
and that ''every enemy merchant ship would be destroyed 
without possibility of avoiding danger to crew and passengers." 
She pointed out that it would not always be possible to pre 
vent neutral vessels from becoming victims of submarine at- 
tacl^. This action was without the color of justification in 
international law. Her only legitimate course was to declare 
and to effect a blockade and then, having done so, to inter- 
cept enemy vessels, discriminating between enemy and neutral 
vessels, enemy and neutral cargoes, in the case of neutral 
ships captured to take to prize courts only those carrying 
contraband, to sink vessels only in extraordinary circum- 
stances, and in every case to give safety to crews and passen- 
gers and to preserve all papers of ships sunk or captured. 
Because of the Allied fleets, it was impossible for Germany 
to do these things by the use of instruments heretofore em- 
ployed. She could attempt them only with a new device — the 
submarine. 

Unquestionably new conditions of war had arisen and new 
means for waging it had come into existence; and just as it 
was recognized that fleets could not be held to a close block- 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. O 

ade of ports, the old three-mile blockade, so it was tacitly 
admitted that a submarine could not be expected to capture 
and take a ship into port, but might sink it, provided it 
practiced visit and search for purposes of discrimination, 
safeguarded the lives of crew and passengers and therefore 
gave ample warning to vessels and did not sink them in 
places or under conditions in which non-combatants could 
not secure safety. These things, under international law, it 
was necessary that Germany have her submarine commanders 
do, or that she set aside international law and make necessity 
the only law, make law to suit herself and the desperate con- 
ditions into which sjie had brought herself by her own aggres- 
sive action. 

The justification Germany attempted to give was that Eng- 
land had declined to respect in full the Declaration of London, 
had extended unnecessarily the list of contraband, had brought 
unfair pressure on neutrals, had declared the North Sea a 
seat of war, and was warring not only on the military forces 
of Germany but on the whole civilian population as well. 
She ignored the fact that England and her allies had fleets 
which, by the use of practices recognized by law, could main- 
tain a blockade and which up to this time they have main- 
tained without sinking ships or killing non-combatants. Ger- 
many could not do these things and had no right to whine 
because the Allies could. She is certainly the last nation in 
the world to demand that only military forces be considered 
as involved in the war. For centuries Prussia had recognized 
clearly, more clearly than any other government, that a whole 
nation makes war, had proceeded early to organize herself on 
that basis, and had gone out to extend and had repeatedly 
succeeded in extending her possessions by force against laws 
of right and morality. Her tender consideration for the civilian 
population and her view of the extent to which it should be 
exempted from the pressure and horrors of war are amply 
illustrated by her dealings in Belgium, Northern France, Po- 
land, Serbia, and on the high seas. Certainly Germany ought 
to have thought of England's fleet and the possibility of being 
cut off before she so recklessly embarked in war. She did not 
establish, and has not yet established, even an approximately 
effective blockade. She impertinently warned neutrals to keep 
their citizens off enemy merchant vessels and out of the war 
zone. Neutral citizens had, and have, a perfect right to travel 
on unarmed or even defensively armed enemy merchant vessels 



6 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

and to go where they please on the high seas. To have acceded 
to such insolent dictation from Germany would have amounted 
to a waiver of international law and right and to the doing 
of an unneutral act against the Allies, just as would compli- 
ance with the suggestion made by Germany on February 16 
and frequently repeated, that neutrals cease to ship arms and 
munitions to the Allies. Germany knew that neutrals had a 
perfect right to do this. She herself had exercised the same 
right more than once. She knew the dealers in this country 
would have filled munitions orders for her and that it was no 
fault of ours that she could not secure them. These things, too, 
she ought to have thought of before she provoked hostilities. 

On February 11 this Government replied, contesting Ger- 
many's position and warning her that it would hold her to a 
strict accountability and take every necessary step to safe- 
guard American lives and property and to secure a full 
enjoyment of their rights on the high seas. 

March 12, 1915, the Allies issued a decree in which they 
declared that it was necessary to prevent merchandise from 
reaching Germany directly or through neutrals. They, how- 
ever, asserted in taking this step that they would not follow 
Germany in her cruel and barbarous methods and would not 
in their intention endanger neutral vessels or the lives of 
non-combatants ; that they would act in strict conformity with 
the laws of humanity. On March 28 a German submarine 
sank the Falaha, drowning an American citizen ; on May 1 
the Gulflight, drowning two American citizens; and on May 7 
the Lusitania, drowning 114. 

These acts were followed by a protest from this Government 
on May 13 in which a demand was made for disavowal of the 
action of the commander of the submarine in sinking the Lusi- 
tania and for reparation. This Government informed Ger- 
many that it would omit no word or act necessary to the 
performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of 
the United States and of its citizens and of safeguarding 
their free exercise. On May 28 Germany replied, placing the 
responsibility for the sinking of the Lusitania on Great Britain 
and the British shipping company, asserting that the Lusi- 
tania was an auxiliary cruiser, which was false; that it was 
armed, which was equally false; and that the company per- 
mitted it to carry munitions, which it had a right to do. On 
the 1st of June, the German Government asserted that the 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. • 

attack on the Gulfli-ght was an unfortunate accident, that 
the submarine commander was in no wise to blame, and ex- 
pressed regret and stated that it would pay damages. 

On the 9th of June the Government of the United States 
replied to Germany's Lusitania note, denying the statements, 
as to the character of the Diisitania and as to her armament, 
asserting that it was sunk without warning, solemnly re- 
newed its representations, and asked assurances that American 
ships and the lives of American citizens be not put in jeopardy. 
A month later Germany answered, saying that she was com- 
pelled to meet the British blockade, and that if her submarine 
commander had practiced visit and search the submarine would 
have been destroyed. She cynically added that in any event 
it was to have been expected that a mighty ship like the 
Ldisitama would remain above the water long enough for its 
passengere to get off. The sinking of this ship, she hypo- 
critically represented, revealed with horrible clearness to what 
jeopardy of human lives the manner of conducting war em- 
ployed by her adversaries led. American ships, she promised, 
would not be hindered from their legitimate business, and 
lives on neutral vessels would not be jeopardized. This was 
promise number one. She decreed that neutral vessels must 
be properly marked, sufficient notice be given in advance, and 
a guaranty be furnished that they would not carry contraband. 
She impudently informed us that she would agree to a pro- 
posal to increase by installments the number of vessels avail- 
able for the passenger service by placing a reasonable number 
of neutral ships under the American flag. She informed us 
that American citizens did not need to travel to Europe on 
enemy vessels and that she was merely following England's 
example in declaring a part of the high seas an area of war. 
In her singular psychology, a mere declaration by her was to 
be given the same regard and weight as an established fact. 
With her lack of a sense of humor, she apparently could see 
no difference between an effective blockade maintained by 
England and a paper blockade announced by her. Accidents 
suffered by neutrals on enemy ships in such an area could 
not be judged differently from those suffered in a war zone on 
land. If this country could not secure a sufficient number of 
neutral ships, then the German Government would permit it 
to place four enemy vessels under its flag. 

Of course, the Secretary of State answered that Germany's 
reply was unsatisfactory. It did not indicate how the prin- 



8 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

ciples of international law and humanity could be applied. 
It proposed a partial suspension of them, which in effect set 
them aside. This Government noted Germany's assurance, 
made once more, as to the freedom of the seas, that the char- 
acter and cargoes of merchant vessels would be first determined 
and that lives of non-combatants would not be jeopardized. 
The United States demanded the disavowal of the act of the 
commander of the submarine, and reparation for injuries. 
It renewed the warning to Germany and advised her that the 
repetition of such an act against the rights of the United 
States affecting her citizens would be regarded as deliberately 
unfriendly. 

Less than a month after this definite representation, Am- 
bassador Page sent notice from London of the sinking of the 
Arabic, with a loss of three American lives. Five days later 
the German ambassador expressed the hope that the United 
States would await full information before acting, and asserted 
that if American lives were lost it was not in accordance with 
the intention of the German Government. A week later he 
gave this assurance: ''Liners will not be sunk by our sub- 
marines without warning and without safety of non-combat- 
ants provided that they do not try to escape or offer resist- 
ance." This was promise number two. He added that this 
policy was decided upon by his government before the Arabic 
was sunk. This was followed, on September 7, by word from 
the German Government through Ambassador Gerard that 
the Arabic was sunk because it planned to attack the sub- 
marine; that the government could not admit indemnity even 
if the commander was mistaken ; and that if he was, the govern- 
ment would be willing to submit the case to The Hague. On 
the 14th, after receiving the facts, Mr. Lansing wrote that 
the Arabic was not warned and did not try to ram the sub- 
marine. On October 5 Bernstorff replied that the German 
Government rules had been made so stringent that no repe- 
tition of the Arabic case was possible, admitted the validity 
of the evidence against the Ai^abi&s attempt to ram the sub- 
marine, expressed regret at the occurrence, disavowed the 
act, and offered indemnity. This was promise number three. 

On January 7, 1916, the German ambassador gave notice 
that German submarines in the Mediterranean would destroy 
any vessels, passenger as well as freight, but only after the 
safety of passengers and crew had been assured. Three months 
later Germany reopened the whole subject, rehashing the old 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. » 

arg:uments, and, with obvious insincerity, expressed the con- 
viction that the United States would appreciate her point of 
view. Germany was evidently getting reader to break all 
her promises. 

On March 27 the State Department sent Ambassador Ger- 
ard word that there was much evidence that the Channel 
passenger steamer Sussex was sunk by a torpedo March 24 
with 328 passengers on board. It asked for information con- 
cerning the following ships which, with Americans on board, 
were sunk: The Englishman, the Manchester Guardian, the 
Eagle Point, and the Berwvndale, all sunk within a compara- 
tively short time. The German Government replied on April 
11, saying either that it did not have sufficient information 
to form an opinion or that it was doubtful if the sinking was 
traceable to a submarine, or that the ship attempted to escape. 
It asserted that the Sussex was not torpedoed, and frivolously 
represented that the German comm-^nder made a sketch of a 
vessel torpedoed at the time in question and that this sketch 
did not look like the picture of the Sussex in the London 
Graphic. If, however, the commander was mistaken Germany 
would be willing to submit the case to The Hague. In other 
words, she made a false statement about the matter and agreed 
that if her statement was proven to be false she would arbi- 
trate. Within a week this Government replied that the Sussex 
was torpedoed ; that this was not an isolated case ; that it was 
clear Germany had made indiscriminate destruction a delib- 
erate policy, contrary to assurances given again and again; 
that the United States had been willing to wait till the course 
of Germany was susceptible of only one interpretation ; and 
that that time had been reached. It added : ''Unless the Im- 
perial German Government should now immediately declare 
in effect an abandonment of its recent methods of submarine 
warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels the 
Government of the United States can have no choice but to 
sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire alto- 
gether." The next day the President addressed the Congress 
to the same efifect. 

On May 4 Germany replied that she was alive to the pos- 
sibility that the Sussex was torpedoed, admitting in effect 
that she was caught in having made a false statement. Her 
commanders, she asserted, had orders to conduct warfare in 
accordance with visit and search except in the case of enemy 
trade with enemy ships in the war zone. As to these she 



10 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

gave no assurance and claimed that she had never given any. 
She regretted that the United States did not extend the 
same sympathy to the German civilian population that it did 
to the victims of submarine warfare. However, she was will- 
ing to go the limit: "In accordance with the principles of 
law German submarines will exercise visit and search before 
sinking merchant vessels recognized by law if they do not 
attempt to escape or resist." This was promise number four. 
The United States, however, must make England restore the 
freedom of the seas; that is, make her surrender her naval 
advantage. If she did not succeed then Germany would be 
facing a new situation. The United States replied, expressing 
satisfaction that Germany had abandoned her indiscriminate 
destruction of merchant vessels and her expectation that there 
would be a scrupulous execution of the altered policy. She 
could not even discuss the suggestion that respect by Germany 
for the rights of the United States should depend on the con- 
duct of any other Government afifecting the rights of neutrals. 
Responsibility in such matters was absolute, not relative. 

In the latter part of the year there were rumors that Ger- 
many would make suggestions concerning peace. It was sus- 
pected that her action would be insincere and would be in- 
tended to affect the public sentiment of neutrals, especially 
that of a portion of the population of the United States. On 
December 12 the German Chancellor indicated that Germany 
might be willing to discuss peace. A few days later, the 
President sent substantially identical notes to the powers, 
suggesting the desirability of a statement of terms on the 
basis of which they would be willing to discuss peace. This 
tliought, of course, had long been in the President's mind aud 
had no connection with the utterances of the German Chan- 
cellor. Germany replied, declining to state terms and pro- 
posing direct negotiations. On January 13, 1917, England 
and France complied with the suggestion of the President 
and stated their terms. 

Germany's insincerity was made clear. She was posing as 
a victor and wished to enter into peace negotiations only 
provided she was regarded as a victor and on the basis of her 
retention of conquered possessions. Previously her prepara- 
tions, including her submarine fleet, had not been matured. 
She drew the negotiations out interminably to gain time. It 
was also now made obvious that her aim in proposing peace 
was to create a favorable attitude among certain parts of 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 11 

the American people, to throw the responsibility on the Allies 
for prolonging the war, and to lay a predicate for her policy 
of submarine ruthlessness. 

On January 31, on the pretext of acknowledging receipt of 
the President's address to the Senate, Germany expressed 
regret that the attitude of the Allies, their lust for conquest, 
made peace impossible. This, she proclaimed, created a new 
situation, to which reference was made in a former note, and 
called for a decision. That decision was nothing less than 
to violate all her solemn pledges, to extend the submarine 
zone to Great Britain, France, and Italy, and to sink all ships. 
She was confident that this action would lead to a speedy 
termination of the war and would be understood by the United 
States. As a favor to this country she would permit it to 
send one steamer a week each way to a particular port, Fal- 
mouth. She fixed the day for arrival, Sunday, and the day 
for departure, Wednesday. The ship must be striped with 
three stripes each a meter wide, white and red alternating, 
and a guaranty must be given that it carry no contraband. 

The President promptly executed his warning to Germany, 
severing diplomatic relations with the German Empire on 
February 3. Immediately the President laid the matter before 
Congress and informed it of his action. American ships, 
however, remained in port as they arrived, as did those of 
other neutrals, and Germany was achieving her ends by men- 
ace. On the same day the Houstonic, an American steamer, 
was sunk, and on February 13 the Lyman M. Law. It was 
obvious that a further step must be taken or this country 
would be impotent and would be playing into the hands of 
the Prussian autocrats. Therefore, on February 26 the Presi- 
dent asked Congress for authority to arm merchant vessels 
and even then said that war, if it came, could come only by 
the act of Germany. 

In the period from February 26 to April 2, six American 
ships were sunk with loss of many lives. . Ships of other neu- 
trals were destroyed and Americans were murdered. In this 
whole period, 226 American citizens, many of them women 
and children, were killed. Armed neutrality obviously was 
ineffective. The country was experiencing all the disadvan- 
tages of war without any of the rights or effectiveness of a 
belligerent. Only one alternative was left. 

On April 2 the President appeared before Congress and 
recommended that a state of war be declared against the Ger- 



12 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

man Government. The Congress accepted the recommendation 
by a vote of 373 to 50 in the House of Representatives and 
82 to 6 in the Senate. 

If we had not accepted the challenge of the war-mad, des- 
perate, dictatorial, contemptuous, hypocritical, and medie- 
val Prussian militarists, we would have had to admit that 
we were not a free nation, that we preferred peace at any 
price and were interested only in the fleshpots. This country 
either had to swallow its own words, abdicate its position as 
a free sovereign power, concede tliat it had no rights except 
those which Germany accorded it, hold its citizens and ships 
away from Europe, or to recognize the plain fact that Germany 
was acting in a hostile manner against it, fight to defend its 
rights, fight for humanity and the cause of civilization and 
free peoples levery where, joining its power with the other free 
nations of the world to put an end to autocratic and brute 
force. There was one choice we could not make — we were in- 
capable of making. We could not "choose the path of submis- 
sion and suffer the most sacred rights of our Nation and our 
people to be ignored or violated." 

Does not this review make it plain what it would mean to 
the world if Germany should win and if free, democratic, 
law-supporting nations like Great Britain and France were 
destroyed, if Europe should fall under the domination of Ger- 
many, headed by the Prussian military autocrats who know 
no right except might, who believe that small and peace-lov- 
ing nations have no standing, and who attach no sanctity to 
a pledge, no matter how solemn? If Prussian militarism 
should be permitted to dominate, then the Anglo-Saxon fight 
for free institutions and liberty, persisting from Runnymede 
to Yorktown, its fight against the absolute rights of kings 
and barons, with its Magna Gharta, its Bill of Rights, its 
Declaration of Independence, and the heroic fight of the French 
people for liberty, would have been made in vain. Has it 
not become patent that Prussia is the last great stronghold 
of feudal absolutism; that in fighting Prussian autocracy 
the modern nations are truly assisting the Germans, who are 
only in part conscious of their servitude, to gain what Eng- 
land, France, and America have had for generations; and that 
we are surely finally about to make the world safe for de- 
mocracy and humanity? 



THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY AUTOCRACY. 

WHAT IS this Prussian military autocracy against which 
is arrayed four-fifths of the world ? How has such an in- 
fluence persisted in a nation which many have regarded 
as foremost in science, in sociology, and in some respects in 
community living? Does it really exist? Many Americans 
find difficulty in believing that there is such a force today in 
Germany. This is natural. They have for the most part 
until recently thought almost exclusively in terms of German 
art, education, science, including medicine, and industry. For 
many generations Americans went to school in Germany. 
German university training was considered almost a pre- 
requisite for academic advancement. German industry was 
known to be making giant strides. Germany was assumed to 
stand for the maximum of efficiency in everything. It was 
the home of science, the final expression of modernism. 

In respect to all these things the world's impressions con- 
tained a large amount of error. Germany has never been 
supreme in science. In discovery, in creative science, and in 
invention she has lagged behind England and France and has 
been inferior to this country. Her peculiar merit has been 
that she has made a system of science, organized it back of 
industry and especially back of those industries which are 
fundamental to military pursuits, and has applied it intelli- 
gently and persistently. Especially in applied chemistry has 
her achievement been marked. In industry her chief perform- 
ance has been to organize it through every possible form of 
state aid or support. Prussia in particular has been highly 
organized at the top. She is really a great public corpora- 
tion for military and industrial purposes. She is a feudal 
estate writ large and, as such, well administered. She has 
been over-organized and organized on an unsound basis; and 
there is truth in the assertion that much of her dissatisfac- 
tion with pre-war conditions was due to the unwholesomeness 
of her economic situation. In a measure she was trying to 
lift herself by her bootstraps. She was strong at the top 

13 



14 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

and weak at the bottom. Taking it by and large, Prussia 
is not and never has been as efficient as the United States or 
Great Britain. These have been insufficiently organized at 
the top, but they have been immensely strong in their founda- 
tions; and what organization they have had has been in the 
main for peace and not for war. 

Americans, even those who travel and read much, have not 
concerned themselves deeply about foreign political institu- 
tions. They have taken note of what lay on the surface and 
have not always carefully examined it. They have observed 
that German cities are orderly and clean, that Germany is 
a confederation, and that suffrage for the Reichstag is uni- 
versal. It was not unnatural for them hastily to assume that 
German institutions are modern, as her science is, and that 
they were therefore democratic. It is not uncommon for 
people to be deceived by names and appearances, especially 
in politics. 

To understand Germany politically we must examine her 
history and fix our attention on Prussia. There are two 
Germanies today: Modern Germany, Germany of the masses, 
kindly, orderly, and industrious; political Germany, govern- 
mental Germany, medieval, absolutist, militarist, aggressive. 
The latter is passing; the former is the Germany of tomorrow. 

About the time of the discovery of America, the Hohenzol- 
lern family ruled over an insignificant tract surrounding the 
village of Berlin. In 1611, its power was extended by the 
union of the Mark of Brandenburg and the Duchy of Prussia. 
In 1640 a strong character, Frederick William, came into 
power. He exercised despotic rule, but put his house in order 
and developed a relatively strong standing army with which 
to make further headway by force as opportunity might offer. 
In 1688, the date of the ^Restoration in England, and the 
beginning of her orderly constitutional government, Frederick 
the Third, an ambitious individual, became head of the house. 
His title was Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia. 
He was anxious for recognition — for the title of king. The 
War of Spanish Succession was about to begin. His over- 
lord, the Holy Roman Emperor, needed assistance. P'rederick 
was prepared to trade and promised the aid of his army in 
exchange for the title of Elector of Brandenburg and King 
of Prussia. This he secured in 1701. Here was the first 
phase of the contact with Austria, the last of which is seen 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 15 

in our own day in tlie complete subordination of Austrian to 
Prussian influence. 

In 1713 a violent, brutish person, Frederick William the 
First, began to reign. Like his ancestors, he kept his eye on 
the main chance, husbanded his resources, and added to his 
army, which at his death numbered 80,000, an immense trained 
force for that day and time. He, too, was ready by force to 
add to his patrimony at the expense of any convenient neigh- 
bor. It was left to his successor to make use of what he had 
prepared. In 1740 the Emperor of Austria, Charles the Sixth, 
the last of the male line of Hapsburgs, died. He had bound 
the leading powers by solemn pledge to recognize as his suc- 
cessor his daughter, Maria Theresa. Frederick, the Great 
Frederick, promptly gave Maria Theresa strong assurance 
of friendship and support, having it in mind at the very time 
to commit a crime against her. He suddenly moved his army 
against her province of Silesia, and after eight years of des- 
perate warfare appropriated it. He at least made no pretense 
of virtue, and is reported to have said : '^Ambition, interest, 
and the desire of making people talk about me carried the 
day and I decided for war." 

Prussia was defeated and humiliated by Napoleon in a 
quick campaign in 1806, but the liberal movements of the period 
scarcely affected her. She bided her time and laid her plans. 
Her next considerable advance was made in 1864, when she 
induced Austria to join her in taking Schleswig and Holstein 
from Denmark. Austria received Holstein ; and in 1866 Prus- 
sia picked a quarrel with her and quickly vanquished her, 
appropriating Holstein and annexing Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, 
and Frankfort, which had taken sides with Austria. Thus she 
rounded out her territory. When the Prussian Parliament 
protested that force was not a sufficient justification for what 
had been done to Denmark, Bismarck replied: ''Our right 
is the right of the German nation to exist, to breathe, to unite." 
The claim of a place in the sun, the doctrine of necessity, 
and the right of might are not of recent appearance in Prus- 
sian history. They have been the outstanding characteristics 
of her thinking and practice since she emerged from medie- 
val obscurity. 

The next stei» Avas the crushing of France in 1870-71, the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the imposition of Prussian 
leadership on Germany under the guise of a confederation. 



16 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

No wonder Bernhardi wrote: "The lessons of history con- 
firm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked 
by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." No 
wonder Prussia believes that a great army is the cornerstone 
of her well-being as a nation and that war is a positive good 
if it succeeds. 

So Prussia has come to dominate Germany. She now seeks 
to dominate the whole of Central Europe and a part of Asia ; 
and if she gains what she wants in this war, she will per- 
sistently lay her plans for the next great aggressive move. 

Prussia is Germany. She has three-fifths the area and five- 
eighths the population. The German Empire is a federation 
only in name. Bismarck's aim was to make Prussia supreme 
in Germany and Germany supreme in Europe. He knew how 
to do the job. This is the underlying fact: Prussia is Ger- 
many, and Prussia politically is feudal. In such a system 
sovereignty is the private right of rulers. The prince may 
deal with his people as private individuals do with their lands. 
Recently we had a clear practical illustration of this in Ger- 
many. The ruler of Waldeck got into debt. He could not 
raise the money to equip his army. He therefore sold his 
rights, his possessions, and his peoples to the King of Prussia 
and went to Italy to live on his income. The people exist for 
the government and not the government for the people. Fred- 
erick William was not Joking when he wrote: "Salvation be- 
longs to the Lord and everything else is my affair" ; or again, 
"We are lord and king and can do what we will." Neither 
was the present Kaiser when he asserted : "We Hohenzol- 
lerns take our crown from God alone and to God alone are 
we responsible in the fulfillment of our duty." He was simply 
revealing the true inwardness of his royal medieval mind 
and ©f Prussian politics, speaking from the background of 
centuries of feudal traditions. Prussia is a feudal state. 
It practices paternalism on a large scale in this modern day 
as did the Duchy of Prussia on a small scale centuries ago. 
It asserts the divine right of the king and of aristocrats to 
rule. 

Prussian governmental arrangements today of all grades 
are the legal expression of the economic interests and domina- 
tion of the large landowners and of their recent allies, the 
great industrial leaders. Feudal estates still persist in the 
kingdom, with their principal strongholds in East Prussia, 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 



17 



Posen, and Pomerania. In Prussia 31 per cent of the land is 
in estates of over 250 acres, large holdings for Central and 
Western Europe; in Posen 55 per cent and in Pomerania 
52 per cent. The average size of 8,365 estates in East Prussia 
is 1,132 acres; of 2,793 in Pomerania, 1,380 acres. Many 
of these are very large and are owned by descendants of 
feudal lords. The great landholder, the junker, is an indi- 
vidualist, independent, militaristic, conservative, in favor of 
armed strength, condescending to inferiors, with a feeling 
for power, and with the instincts of a soldier, a supporter 
of monarchy as long as monarchy has a strong arm and sup- 
ports him and his interests. At first the junker fought the 
new industrial class, but a reconciliation was effected, and 
recently the powerful leaders of the two classes have cooper- 
ated. The caste system prevails everywhere. Society is strati- 
fied and the individual in each stratum is trained for his 
duties in his particular sphere. Education and society, as 
well as the army, are organized on this basis ; and there is 
no small truth in the witticism that "every Prussian is satis- 
fied because he has somebody below him to kick." Royalty, 
the junkers, and the great industrial leaders run Prussia, and 
Prussia runs Germany. 

"But," it may be asked, "how can this be? The Reichstag 
is the popular house of the Imperial Parliament, and its mem- 
bers are elected by universal suffrage. Is this not conclusive 
evidence of popular participation and control?" Let us see. 
In the first place, the electoral districts for the Reichstag 
have not been changed since they were formed in 1871 when 
Germany was dominantly agricultural, rural. The great in- 
crease in population has been in the cities, and these are the 
homes of the Liberalists and Radicals. It would have been 
dangerous to change the districts. This would have given the 
Liberals and Radicals full representation. Today Berlin should 
have at least twenty representatives, and elects only eight. 
The number of voters in agricultural districts equal to those 
of Berlin returned forty-eight members. In 1907 twenty seats 
were won by the Conservatives with an average vote of 10,500, 
and six by Socialists with an average vote of 77,500. The aver- 
age vote for all Socialist members was 67,000 and for all Con- 
servatives 25,680. The significance of this can readily be seen 
when it is stated that out of 12,260,000 votes cast in 1912, 
1,602,000 were National Liberal, 1,996,000 represented the 



18 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

strength of the Center party, 1,136,000 that of the Conservative, 
and 5,750,000 that of the Socialist and Radical parties. 

But in reality this makes very little difference. The Reich- 
stag is little more than a debating society. It was intended 
to be nothing more, to be a "sop" to the progressives. Its 
powers are great on paper, but exceedingly small in reality. 
It has the constitutional function of passing on the budget, 
but the principal revenue laws are permanent. The Reichstag 
can neither increase nor decrease the schedules, nor make any 
change in the existing situation unless the King of Prussia 
wishes it. This comes about in this way: The Bundesrath 
is the upper house of the Imperial Parliament. Its members 
are delegates from the various states, representing several 
state governments and not the people. They vote according 
to instructions, and one member may cast the vote for any 
delegation. Fourteen members can defeat any measure, and 
the Government of Prussia — that is, the King of Prussia — 
controls twenty votes. 

The Reichstag does not really initiate legislation. Im- 
portant measures are first discussed in the Bundesrath, then 
they go to the Reichstag, and back to the Bundesrath for 
approval. The initiative for the most part comes from the 
Chancellor, who is also Prime Minister of Prussia. The ruler, 
as Emperor, may instruct the Chancellor to prepare a measure, 
as King he may order him to introduce it and may direct 
amendments to be made and prevent changes. As Emperor 
he may promulgate the law, and as King he administers it 
in Prussia. There is no imperial cabinet. The Chancellor is 
the only minister. The other heads of departments act in^ 
dependently of each other but under the supervision of the 
Chancellor. The Chancellor is not in the slightest degree re- 
sponsible to Parliament or to the people, but solely to the Em- 
peror, and this by reason of the fact that he is also Prime 
Minister of Prussia and represents the King of Prussia in the 
Bundesrath. When von Bethmann-Hollweg became Chancellor 
he emphasized this fact, asserting "I do not serve Parliament," 
adding that he would not play the rdle of servant of the 
people's representatives. The Chancellor does not sit in the 
Reichstag as such, but as Prussian delegate to the Bundes- 
rath, all members of which have a right to sit in the lower 
house and there to support their measures. 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 19 

Of the 397 members of the Reichstag, Prussia sends 236. 
The body can be dissolved at any time by the Bundesrath, 
with the consent of the Emperor. This power has been used 
effectively three times to break down the resistance of the 
Reichstag ; in 1878, when it refused to pass the bill to suppress 
the Socialists; in 1887, when it would not agree to fix the 
size of the army for seven years; and in 1893, when it de- 
clined to change the military system. In each case the new 
body did what the government demanded. Since the principal 
financial arrangements are matters of standing law, if the 
Reichstag refuses to pass a new budget increasing allowances, 
or passes one reducing them, the government can be carried 
on on the old basis without any action on the part of Parlia- 
ment. We find a parallel for this in English history in the 
days of the Stuarts. 

The upper house, the Bundesrath, consists of 61 Instructed 
delegates, usually officers of state, frequently ministers, voting 
under instruction and appointed without fixed tenure. Of 
this number, Prussia controls twenty. This body and the King 
of Prussia dominate the Reichstag. 

By the constitution, the presidency of the confederation 
belongs to the King of Prussia. He appoints the Chancellor 
and most other officers, directs foreign afl'airs, commands the 
army and navy of the whole empire, inspects and disposes of 
troops, appoints all officers whose commands include the con- 
tingent of the state, and the selection of all general officers is 
subject to his approval. Prussian military regulations are en- 
forced throughout the empire. The Emperor declares defen- 
sive war, and there is no authority to determine what war 
is defensive and what offensive. Bismarck's principal aim 
was to create a powerful military state. All the world knows 
how well he succeeded. 

Many of the foregoing important direct powers belong to 
the Emperor. Obviously larger powers accrue to him by virtue 
of the fact that he is King of Prussia and that Prussia is 
Germany. The Emperor, as such, has no material rights in 
legislation, no authority to appoint or to disapprove laws, 
yet he constantly does these things. He has no power to issue 
decrees, yet here also, says Zom, the German publicist, "The 
monarchical principle, without legal provisions, and indeed 
contrary to them, has forced recognition. * * * We, Wil- 
helm, by grace of God, German Emperor, order with the con- 



20 WHY WE WENT TO WAR, 

sent of the Bundesrath." Again Zorn says, ''The inspiring 
forces of the world's history and the magnitude of his actual 
power have given the Emperor a position wholly different 
from what was legally intended and places him on a par with 
monarchical emperors — we see how formally inspired and even 
constitutional provisions lose their force in face of the con- 
straining necessities of national life." So the Prussianizing 
of Germany is complete. There is normally a higher law in 
Germany than the constitution. That law is the law of neces- 
sity or might. 

Let us take a more intimate view of Prussia and ascertain 
what are the arrangements of this dominant member, what 
chance is afforded the people for expression. Take her Par- 
liament, the Landtag. What does it represent? Is there a 
government responsible to the people? The Landtag has two 
chambers, the house of lords and lower house. The former is 
a medieval body composed of princes of royal blood, members 
who are independent princes of the Holy Roman Empire or 
hereditary members designated at will by the King, and others 
designated by him at will or on nomination of landholders. 
The King can control it at any time by appointing new mem- 
bers. It now has a membership of 300, one-third hereditaiy 
nobles with large estates — junkers — and one-third dominated 
by landholders — junkers. It is a class assembly, far removed 
from the people. 

The lower house is composed of members elected indirectly 
by an electoral hodj. One member is selected in each district. 
The electoral body is selected in this fashion : One-third of 
it is designated by the large taxpayers who pay the first third 
of the taxes, one-third by those who pay the second third of 
the taxes, and the remainder by the rest of the voters. From 
three to five per cent of the voters choose one-third of the 
electors ; from ten to twelve per cent a third, or about fifteen 
per cent of the voters choose 213 of the electors. In 2,200 
districts one man selects a third of the electors. In 1908 
the number of votes cast was 2,215,000. The Social Demo- 
crats, with 601,000 votes, elected seven members. They should 
have secured 105. The Conservatives, with 356,000 votes, 
elected 152. They were entitled to 62. The Clericals, with 
502,000 votes, won 104 seats, instead of 88, their proper num- 
ber. The Liberal party secured 28 instead of 40. In East 
Prussia the number of inhabitants to a representative was 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. - 21 

63,000; in Berlin 170,000. Berlin secured nine votes and 
should have had 24. One-fourth the population in agricultural 
districts selected 161 members ; one-fourth in the cities elected 
41. Remember, too, that the ballot is not secret and that 
pressure is consistently brought to bear on the lower-class 
voter. The municipal councils are selected in the same way. 
The classes rule. 

The province is the highest subdivision of Prussia. Its 
chief executive is appointed by the King. Its legislative body 
is not elected by the people but by legislative bodies of the 
next lowest subdivisions, the circles and the municipalities. 
The president may veto the action of the body if it goes be- 
yond its jurisdiction. Its measures must be approved by the 
King, who may dissolve it at will. 

The circle is the chief local subdivision. Its principal admin- 
istrative officer is appointed by the president of the province. 
The members of its legislative body, the Kreistag, are divided 
between the cities and the rural districts, not more than one- 
lialf to the cities. The members assigned to the cities are not 
elected directly by the people but by the municipal assemblies, 
which represent property. The rural members are divided into 
two equal groups: The great landowner and large taxpayer 
of the rural community elect half; the other half are elected 
indirectly by a body composed (1) of those who pay a small 
tax, (2) of proprietors of manors, and (3) of electors selected 
by rural communal assemblies. To be a voter even for one 
of these electors who shares the doubtful privilege of joining 
larger taxpayers and owners of medieval manors in selecting 
half the rural members of the local assembly the other half 
of which is controlled absolutely by wealth, the individual 
himself must be a small taxpayer. This is certainly placing 
the individual, the man, politically at the vanishing point. 

There is no manhood suffrage in Prussia, in Germany, where 
it counts for anything. It does not count for anything so 
far as the Eeichstag is concerned. Evidently in Prussia it is 
non-existent. Landowners and men of industrial standing are 
strongly intrenched. They have dug themselves in and made 
their administrative and legislative trenches of reinforced con- 
crete. The junker is not only on top; he is pyramided, 
Autocracy, absolutism, is -supreme. 

Granted that the ruling class does its paternalistic job for 
the people as well as such a job can be done by a few for the 



22 WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 

many, at best it must be inadequately done; for no part of 
the people can understand the needs of all the people and 
satisfy them as well as all the people can. Granted, I say, 
that the job, for a paternalistic job, is well done, still the 
essential nature of the regime is unsound, unmodern, medie- 
val and out of tune with modern tendencies. This govern- 
ing class, believing in expansion by armed force, provoked 
war, violated the neutrality of Belgium, directed the submarine 
campaign, sweeping aside international law and custom built 
up through the centuries, sinking great passenger and freight 
vessels like the Lusitama, the Arabic, and Sussex, slaughter- 
ing women and children. It ordered the deportation of Bel- 
gian civilians, planned and executed the campaign of spying 
and violence in this and other neutral countries, and directed 
the submarine negotiations with all its evasions, cynicism, and 
duplicity, again and again making solemn promises, constantly 
violating them, and finally brazenly breaking their most solemn 
pledge to a great, patient, peaceful power. These people en- 
tertain the medieval notion that one nation's prosperity is 
another nation's menace, that it is .to the interest and happi- 
ness of one nation to dominate other peoples and areas, and 
that small nations have no rights which strong nations need 
to protect and have no justification for existence. 

The President told us that for a little while he was unable 
to believe that such things would in fact be done by any 
government as have been done by Germany during this war. 
It was difficult for the American people to credit it. It is yet 
difficult to believe that the great masses of the German people, 
if they were fully informed, would sanction it. It is only 
through a knowledge of the character and medieval ideals of 
the few who dominate Prussia and Germany that we can begin 
to understand it. With such information, was can more easily 
appreciate what was in the President's mind when he said, "We 
have no quarrel with the German people. * * * It was not 
upon their impulse that their government acted in entering the 
v/ar. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. 
It was a war determined upon as wars used to be deter- 
mined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples nowhere 
were consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and 
waged in the interests of dynasties or by little groups of am- 
bitious men who were accustomed to use their fellowmen as 
tools. * * * A steadfast concert for peace can never be 



\ 



WHY WE WENT TO WAR. 23 



\ 



led except by a partnership of democratic nations. No 
.^xatic government could be trusted to keep faith within 
and to observe its covenants. * * * -^q are accepting 
this challenge of hostile purposes because we know that in 
such a government following such methods we can never have 
a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, 
always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, 
there can be no assured security for the democratic govern- 
ments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of 
battle with the natural foe of liberty and shall, if necessary, 
spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its 
pretensions and power. We are glad now that we see the facts 
with no veil of false pretenses about them, to fight thus for the 
ultimate peace of the world and for the liberty of its peoples, 
the German people included ; for the rights of nations great and 
small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their 
way of living and obedience." Was he not clearly right when 
he asserted in his answer to His Holiness the Pope: "We can- 
not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a 
guaranty of anything that is to endure unless explicitly sup- 
ported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of 
the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world 
would be justified in accepting. Without such guaranties, 
treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants 
to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjust- 
ments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the Ger- 
man Government, no man, no nation can depend on. We must 
await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples 
of the Central Powers." 



\ 
I 
\ 



LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 




021 929 097 4 



WE ARE AT WAR— 

Because Germany made war on us, sunk 
our ships, and killed our citizens. 

To assert and to defend our rights. 

To make good our claim that we are 
a free nation. 

To have the kind of institutions we wish. 

To live the kind of life we have deter- 
mined to live. 

— Secretary Houston. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



021 929 097 4 



